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Massachusetts Institute of Technology and ICREA / Universitat Pompeu Fabra
London’s financial market underwent dramatic change after 1700. More limited
than Paris or Amsterdam in the seventeenth century, London became the leading
financial centre in Europe in the eighteenth century. There is an extensive and
growing literature on the causes of this change, but comparatively little on the
change itself. This article provides detailed information on the operation of the
London financial market around 1700 by describing the operations of a nascent
London bank.
It is an often-repeated truism that goldsmiths became bankers, and we have many
records of isolated transactions by goldsmith-bankers.2 These fragments have been
taken as the answer to a question when they could instead be seen as the question.
Banking is a difficult business, and it does not resemble the goldsmith trade in the
kinds of risks it involves. How did goldsmiths become bankers? Was the transition
trivial, despite the difference in the economic activities, or was it a process of
learning?
We argue for the latter. Learning to be a fractional-reserve banker in the early
eighteenth century was a difficult task. This is shown by the rapid demise of many
goldsmith-bankers at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth
century. Goldsmith-bankers failed after the ‘Stop of the Exchequer’ in 1672, and
enough of them did so that goldsmiths’ notes were unacceptable as currency during
the 1670s. Many firms and individuals drifted into the banking business, only to give
it up after a few years, and most West End bankers in 1700 were no longer in the
1 We thank Henry Hoare for kindly permitting access to the Hoare’s Bank archives and Victoria
Hutchings and Barbra Sands help with the ledgers. Claudia Goldin, Farley Grubb, Ephraim Kleiman,
Bob Margo, Petra Moser, Dick Sylla and Stephen Quinn helped us with their comments; seminar
participants at Harvard offered important suggestions. Financial support by the Leverhulme Trust
through a Philip Leverhulme Prize for Hans-Joachim Voth and through CREI (Barcelona) is
gratefully acknowledged. Chris Beauchamp, Anisha Dasgupta, Marek Polonski, Elena Reutskaya
and Jacopo Torriti provided excellent research assistance
2 Charles P. Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1984).150 peter temin and hans-joachim voth
business by 1725. There were only two dozen private bankers in the West End at
that time; the total number of banks in London did not exceed 42 in 1770.3
The economic literature on financial-system development distinguishes four
main functions: the transfer of resources, the allocation of capital, the pooling of
savings, and the management of risk. Much of the recent research on the develop-
ment of banking and finance prior to the Industrial Revolution has emphasised the
payments function and the development of public creditworthiness, that is, the first
two functions.4 We argue that the transition from goldsmith to deposit-taking
banker was at least as important because it dramatically improved the financial
system’s ability to act as an aggregation device for savings, and as an allocation
mechanism for capital, that is, to pool savings and manage risk.
We provide evidence of the difficulty of entering this new business from the
detailed records of a West End bank in its formative years, during a crucial period of
London’s evolution as a financial market. Richard Hoare was a goldsmith who
moved to Fleet Street in 1690, signalling his intention to complete the transition
from all-purpose jeweller to banker he had begun in the 1670s. He was successful in
this effort, and Hoare’s Bank still exists as an independent private bank, operating
from the same address as Richard Hoare and serving a selected group of families,
some of whom have been with the bank for many generations.5 The bank’s archives
contain records for the early eighteenth century that document the process by which
Richard Hoare made the transition from goldsmith to banker.
We argue that the increasing sophistication of Richard Hoare and his successors
can be seen as the learning needed in the use of new technology. Many of the
operational procedures and techniques had been used by earlier bankers, such as the
use of double-entry book-keeping, and the records at Hoare’s reflect the firm’s
adaptation to contemporary ‘best practice’. Nonetheless, the bank was among the
pioneers of a new economic activity, the extension of credit outside the tight-knit
community of merchants or the even smaller community of princely rulers, which
was financed by taking deposits. This is not to deny the existence of banks before
1700, but rather to note that they specialised almost exclusively in the financing of
trade or lending to the crown, providing payment services, and extending loans to a
small group of international merchants.6 Hoare did not introduce a new spinning
3 J. K. Horsefield, ‘The duties of a banker: the eighteenth century view’, Economica, 8 (1941); D. M.
Joslin, ‘London private bankers, 1720–85’, Economic History Review, 7 (1954); Stephen Quinn,
‘Goldsmith-banking: mutual acceptance and interbanker clearing in Restoration London’,
Explorations in Economic History, 34.4 (1997), p. 411.
4 P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit,
1688–1756 (New York: 1967); Larry Neal, The Rise of Financial Capitalism (Cambridge, 1990);
Stephen Quinn, ‘Money, finance and capital markets’, in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds.),
Cambridge Economic History of England (Cambridge, 2003).
5 H. P. R. Hoare, Hoare’s Bank: A Record, 1673–1932 (London: Hoare’s Bank, 1932).
6 Neal,  The Rise of Financial Capitalism; Quinn, ‘Goldsmith-banking’; Herman Van der Wee,
‘Monetary, credit and banking systems’, in E. E. Rich and C. H. Wilson (eds.), The Cambridge
Economic History of Europe (Cambridge, 1977).151 banking as an emerging technology
device, but turned a relatively new idea – lending to private individuals financed by
deposits – into a successful business.
To switch from goldsmith to credit intermediary at that time was to enter into a
difficult business. Hoare’s joined a handful of financial-pioneer goldsmith-bankers.
Just as the use of any new machine requires a process of learning and adaptation, so
too the introduction of commercial banking to the wider public of London required
organisational innovation by Richard Hoare and his associates. Hoare’s Bank sur-
vived, in contrast to most other entrants into this new business. This longevity made
Hoare’s Bank atypical of early banks. We would like to contrast Hoare’s business
practices with those of banks that did not succeed and derive some conclusions
about the key factors of success in this fashion, but that obviously is not possible. Yet
the varying fortunes of this unusual bank can tell us much about the challenges faced
by nascent banks. If it was difficult for the rare success to make the transition to
banker, how much harder was it for others?
This new activity was similar to modern banking, but different in several respects.
Typical of new activities, it was fraught with uncertainty. Legal issues surrounding
bank transactions introduced confusions and ambiguities lasting well into the nine-
teenth century. Typical of the eighteenth century, banking also was subject to many
restrictions. The usury laws perhaps were the most obvious and most important of
these for existing banks; the prohibition of joint-stock banks may have been more
important for potential entrants.7
We first discuss the nature of the learning process of Richard Hoare and his
partners and discuss some measures of learning for a nascent bank. We then describe
data from balance sheets and use them to provide an overview of the bank’s business
in the early eighteenth century. The key results from this exercise are then discussed
in the context of learning the business of banking as a new ‘technology’. Finally, we
turn to individual lending transactions on loans to reinforce our conclusions, dem-
onstrating how credit was extended to particular individuals and how the interest
rate charged on these transactions evolved over time. Given the usury laws, banking
decisions in early eighteenth-century London were directed towards selecting
suitable borrowers, not the interest rate at which they borrowed.
I
We conceptualise the process of learning in business organisations in a manner
inspired by the work of Alfred Chandler. He chronicled changes in business
structures and strategies in a series of volumes, arguing that changes in managerial
practices were innovations as important as introducing new machines. Hoare’s Bank
7 J. K. Horsefield, ‘British banking practices, 1750–1850: some legal sidelights’, Economica, 19 (1952),
pp. 308–21; Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth, ‘Credit Rationing and crowding out during the
industrial revolution: evidence from Hoare’s Bank, 1702–1862’, Explorations in Economic History, 42.3
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did not have any new machines to use; it was extending its expertise into new
dimensions.
Hoare’s move from goldsmith to banker involved learning at two levels: how to
emulate lending practices already widely used at the time (firm-specific copying),
and how to adapt the system of deposit banking so that it could serve as the basis for
a commercially successful enterprise (innovation).8 We cannot distinguish perfectly
between the two – there had been goldsmiths holding deposits and merchant
bankers providing international payment services for a long time, but only at the end
of the seventeenth century were a few pioneers combining deposit-taking with
lending and brokerage services. Hoare’s Bank was one of these pioneers, extending
credit to a West End clientele. As Chandler did, we use the records of a successful
business to represent changes in the industry.9 Our method also is similar in spirit to
some recent analysis of evolving stock-market institutions.10
Since we have more data than Chandler typically did, we can get inside the new
bank to some degree. We therefore further conceptualise the learning process as the
accumulation of human capital – a set of ‘operating instructions’, probably largely
unwritten, that evolved gradually over time, crystallising what experience had
taught the partners. The partners invested in education by foregoing profits initially
in order to be able to earn higher profits later. More precisely, we infer that the
Hoares used what Fudenberg and Levine call fictitious play in their account of learn-
ing in repeated games, modifying their behaviour in response to the results of their
strategy. We of course only see the outcomes, but we argue later that this kind of
learning is better than the alternatives to explain what we see. This learning process
was cumulative over the first decades of the eighteenth century, but it must have
been affected also by a few dramatic events.11
Richard Hoare and his sons were not just learning a new trade where they could
learn from established tradesmen. They were innovating and learning at the same
time, participating in ‘technological innovation as a learning process’.12 Richard
Hoare and his sons therefore had no template against which to measure themselves.
We look back at them and evaluate their actions relative to standards that have been
formulated since they lived and learned. We should not expect the Hoares to have
gone to the best practice as we now see it, and we should not expect them to have
been able instantly to operate a bank along modern lines. Extensive exploration was
8 We thank an anonymous referee for helping us clarify these points.
9 Alfred Dupont Chandler, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise
(Cambridge, MA, 1990); Alfred Dupont Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in
American Business (Cambridge, MA, 1977).
10 Ann Carlos, J. Key and J. Dupree, ‘Learning and the creation of stock-market institutions: evidence
from the Royal African and Hudson’s Bay Companies, 1670–1700’, Journal of Economic History, 58.2
(1998).
11 Gary Becker, Human Capital (New York, 1964); Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine, The Theory
of Learning in Games (Cambridge, MA, 1998), p. 7.
12 Nathan Rosenberg, Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics (Cambridge, 1982), p. 120.153 banking as an emerging technology
needed to find a viable business model, which might not in hindsight be the best one
possible.
Deposit banking presents a number of challenges. Four are central from our point
of view. First, margins are low since the cost of funding cannot fall below zero. The
obvious solution to this problem – using a high ratio of deposits to equity to leverage
up returns on capital – is fraught with risks. A ‘run’ can quickly spell the end of an
otherwise successful venture, even if assets exceed liabilities. Managing the risk of
illiquidity is the first challenge for any nascent deposit-taking banker. It was com-
pounded by period-specific factors, such as the usury limit on interest rates. The
unlimited-liability partnerships of the time heavily penalised even modest levels of
risk-taking, since, if worst came to worst, all family assets could be lost. Second,
access to credit creates a whole host of incentive problems. Repayments are uncer-
tain, and defaults can easily overwhelm a poorly capitalised bank. Since regular
payments (either interest or principal) were uncommon, bankers had only the most
vague notions about how their loans were performing prior to their being paid off.
Monitoring to reduce the risk of insolvency is costly if it involves a large number of
borrowers. Lending to fewer individuals can keep costs low, but leads to a concen-
tration of risks. Third, in a new business such as banking, customers’ expectations
about the range of services offered and their prices are not yet stable. They are partly
in a state of flux because competitors may decide to change the price/service mix
that they offer. Banks need to decide which preferences of their customers to take
seriously, and which ones to ignore – conditional on a convergence of business
practices in the relevant market segment. Finally, nascent bankers needed to decide
whom to serve. Customer segmentation is never easy, but it was probably especially
hard in the early eighteenth century. Merchants had great liquidity needs and offered
substantial collateral as well as plenty of indirect information about their reliability
and wealth. They also offered a market for associated services such as international
payments. The gentry and nobility had a specific life-cycle component to their
borrowing needs – great as older sons, negligible after they inherit the title and estate
from their father. Those with positive net worth often kept money on deposit in
London to facilitate payments and to invest in government securities; those in debt
may have few assets that could serve as collateral other than the prospects of getting
lucky in the genetic lottery.
Today, we know how many of these problems were overcome. We have rules of
thumb for sensible leverage ratios, loan durations, diversification of loan portfolios
and customer segmentation. Most of these decisions had to be made in a trial-and-
error fashion by the pioneers – even if many of their insights came to be compiled
and circulated quite quickly. It would be dangerous to write a ‘Whig history’ of
early deposit banking, with all deviations from more familiar practices seen as an
unprofessional and uneconomic aberration whose disappearance was an unambigu-
ous sign of progress. Hoffman, Rosenthal and Postel-Vinay’s analysis of French
notaries reminds us that even rather peculiar institutional arrangements can last for a
long time, and only disappear as a result of idiosyncratic shocks. We try to trace the154 peter temin and hans-joachim voth
evolution of banking practices at Hoare’s as an open process, in the way that it must
have seemed to the first generations of deposit bankers, a learning process without
obvious answers.
Economic theorists call learning ‘adequate’ when agents experiment enough
to maximise their own profits.13 This is of course an exaggeration in any given
historical situation – neither agents nor anyone else can know with certainty if prof-
its are actually at the maximum that could have been attained. We shall nonetheless
use profitability as one of our key indicators of learning, as suggested by the classic
contributions in this literature.14 The economic environment did not exactly
facilitate learning for the sector as a whole. In the theoretical literature, optimal
experimentation may not lead to adequate learning, depending on how costly
experimentation is and how much information it reveals. Low rates of optimal
experimentation are in part simply a result of banking’s inherent riskiness – if
catastrophic discontinuities are one of the main worries on the mind of managers,
they will be much less happy to try out new business concepts. Also, the economic
environment at large partly determines how much can be learned from any given
degree of experimentation. For agents to attain their global maximum, their payoff
function has to be analytic – local experimentation around their (myopic) starting
point must lead to the global optimum. In the presence of other banks, for example,
also trying to decide if they need to offer services like free overdrafts, each
bank experimenting on its own may end up with a distinctly sub-optimal answer
(equivalent to local maxima in the theoretical learning literature) to the four key
questions raised above.15 Finally, most learning will be inadequate if the level of
‘noise’ becomes high. Some models, like the classic Aghion et al. one on optimal
learning by experimentation, suggest that only very low levels of noise allow agents
to approach their first-best solution. At a time of plentiful macroeconomic shocks
such as wars and financial instability (in the form of the South Sea Bubble), plus the
numerous discontinuities induced by the death of partners and other extraneous
events, it must have been very hard for nascent bankers to decide which of the many
parameters that they could adjust made a difference, and what was really responsible
for the evolution of their profits (of which they only ever had an estimate, based on
assumptions about likely default and repayment rates).
We use five indices of learning to chronicle Hoare’s progress. One sign of
a learning period is a low rate of growth. Firms that continue at the margin of
existence are not firmly based; their marginal existence suggests inadequate under-
standing of the new business or process. The low growth rate is a rough index of the
13 Philippe Aghion et al., ‘Optimal learning by experimentation’, Review of Economic Studies, 58.4
(1991).
14 David Easley and Nicholas M. Kiefer, ‘Controlling a stochastic process with unknown parameters’,
Econometrica, 56.5 (1988); David Easley and Nicholas M. Kiefer, ‘Optimal learning with endogenous
data’, International Economic Review, 30.4 (1989); Michael Rothschild, ‘A two-armed bandit theory of
market pricing’, Journal of Economic Theory, 9.2 (1974).
15 Aghion et al., ‘Optimal learning by experimentation’, p. 642.155 banking as an emerging technology
cost of learning – the investment in human capital. Another index of learning to be
a bank is the decline of loans without interest, a practice of the goldsmith trade
where goods were held and pawned. These loans are not part of good banking
practice, and their presence may be taken as a sign of learning in process. A third
index comes from the fact that a well-functioning bank needs to hold enough cash at
any one point in time to be liquid, that is, to be able to pay out funds to depositors
on demand. A fourth index is the amount of (personal) equity in the business. Banks
operate today with a relatively small equity base. This measure demonstrates that the
operators understand their business well enough to ensure the solvency of the bank
– that losses as a result of default or trading of securities are not greater than the
equity base. Many businesses start with personal investments and then progress to a
more varied and solid capital structure; in the days of unlimited personal liability
partnerships, this was largely a result of retained profits. Finally, the results of all these
characteristics show up in regular, satisfactory profits. We presume Richard Hoare
was seeking financial gains like his fellow entrepreneurs, and we take declining and
low profits for several years as a sign of acquiring the knowledge of a new business
the hard way.
Charles Kindleberger dated the transition from goldsmiths to bankers to the
middle of the seventeenth century, citing the experience of a few goldsmiths
without much information about their banking activities.16 North and Weingast
argued that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 put government finances on a solid
footing, providing a base on which the London financial market and the economy
as a whole could grow.17 Several authors have acknowledged the changes in the
generation after 1688, while denying that the Glorious Revolution was key.18
Quinn used the records of another early West End bank, Child’s Bank, to test the
North and Weingast hypothesis.19 In contrast to his work, which uses microlevel
data to evaluate the financial effects of institutional change, we examine business
practice with a view to detailing the learning of successful methods.
16 Charles P. Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe, 2nd edn (Oxford, 1993), pp. 53–4.
17 Douglas North and Barry Weingast, ‘Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions
governing public choice in seventeenth-century England’, Journal of Economic History, 49.4 (1989);
Ross Levine and Sara Zervos, ‘Stock markets, banks, and economic growth’, American Economic
Review, 88.3 (1998).
18 Gregory Clark, ‘The political foundations of modern economic growth: England, 1540–1800’,
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 26.4 (1996); Stephen Quinn, ‘The Glorious Revolution’s effect on
English private finance: a microhistory, 1680–1705’, Journal of Economic History, 61.3 (2001); Nathan
Sussman and Yishay Yafeh, ‘Constitutions and commitment: evidence on the relation between
institutions and the cost of capital’, unpublished manuscript, Hebrew University, Jerusalem (2002);
Patrick O’Brien, ‘Fiscal exceptionalism: Great Britain and its European rivals – from civil war to
triumph at Trafalgar and Waterloo’, LSE Economic History Working Paper, 65 (2001).
19 Quinn, ‘The Glorious Revolution’s effect on English private finance’. We thank Stephen Quinn
for pointing out that, initially, Hoare’s was simply adopting practices pioneered by other
goldsmith-banks that had made the switch at an earlier stage.156 peter temin and hans-joachim voth
Thomas Kuhn argued that the process of learning in science is a difficult one. He
suggested that what we think of as learning may not be individual learning at all, but
simply the replacement of one generation by another. No one learns a new scientific
paradigm; the old fogies simply disappear.20 This obviously is too strong an assump-
tion for business, since there are many examples of successful adaptations. We
cannot however rule out this possibility in the case of Hoare’s Bank. Richard Hoare
died in 1718, and it was only under the leadership of his sons, Henry and Benjamin,
that the bank began to perform consistently in a way that sustained it over the long
haul. Richard undoubtedly learned parts of his new trade, but it was his sons who
translated these lessons into commercial success.
II
Until 1701, the bank recorded all transactions in a single ledger, with loans being
registered side-by-side with sales coming from the goldsmith side of the business.
Repayments of loans were treated similarly to the completion and final delivery
of an item of jewellery or plate ordered by a customer – by being struck out in
the ledger. After 1701, this practice gave way to the more elaborate accounting
techniques that bankers in Europe had developed since the Renaissance.
During the early eighteenth century, the bank kept three types of ledgers. One
recorded daily transactions of cashing bills, paying out the money from a new loan,
and receiving deposits. The loan register, with separate entries organised by the
name of the borrower, provided a sequential record of loans made by the bank,
whether for interest or not. The clerks assiduously noted the date of each transac-
tion, the titles and names of the borrowers, the amount of the loan, repayments of
principal and interest rate payment, and the type of collateral offered. In cases of
defaults, the loans were normally transferred to the partner who approved them –
and his capital with the bank was debited for the amount in question. While many of
Hoare’s customers only used the bank for a few transactions, some customers used its
services intensively, with several transactions per year.
The bank balanced its books periodically in the form of balance sheets. Initially, it
did so in September of each year. Hoare’s balance-sheet ledgers contain annual totals
for the bank’s assets, liabilities and profits. The bank’s total assets fluctuated strongly
from year to year, reflecting the short-term nature of many loans and deposits, as
well as varying levels of capital committed to banking activities by the partners at
Hoare’s. While the remaining goldsmith business initially affected both sides of the
balance sheet, the borrowing and the lending side show a relatively rapid transition
to a banker’s business.
Total asset values are shown in Figure 1 up to 1742, with only a few missing
balance sheets prior to the South Sea Bubble. In the first year after the ‘initial’
20 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1970).157 banking as an emerging technology
accounts were drawn up, Hoare’s assets jumped from £146,000 to £207,000, but
then declined. The high point in 1703 was not surpassed until 1720, during the
South Sea Bubble, and it was followed by a sharp contraction and wide swings in
overall lending activity. Only after surviving the financial chaos of the South Sea
Bubble did Hoare’s assets begin to grow steadily, except for a temporary windfall in
1727/28. The troubled two decades prior to the South Sea Bubble were indicators
of an extended period of learning and exploration. It was only after the bursting of
the bubble that Hoare’s Bank found a modus operandi that generated sustained
growth.
Figure 1 therefore suggests that the bank had not mastered the basics of fractional-
reserve lending to such a degree that it could grow this business before 1720. On
many occasions, Hoare’s Bank struggled to maintain itself for the first two decades of
the eighteenth century while its partners, Richard and his son, Henry, learned this
new business. The contrast between the path of Hoare’s total assets before and after
1720 is eloquent testimony to the need to learn a new business.
Hoare’s balance sheet was separated into assets and liabilities. Assets were grouped
into six broad categories – gold and silver, diamonds and pearls, ‘money due as
lent upon interest and purchasing stocks’, loans without interest, ‘several people
for plate’ and a balance remaining in cash. The composition of Hoare’s assets is
shown in Figure 2. Initially, some of the assets appear to be the remnants of Hoare’s
goldsmithing business – such as the £9,489 the firm held in September 1702 in the
form of precious metals and stone. Loans to customers for plate fall into the same
category. Richard Hoare had financed clients’ purchases of jewellery in his days as a
goldsmith, with banking operations facilitating the transaction in the same way as
Figure 1. Hoare’s total assets, 1702–42158 peter temin and hans-joachim voth
the finance divisions of General Motors or Ford today extend loans to customers
wishing to buy their cars. The bank also acted as a broker for its customers, execut-
ing trades in a variety of securities and financing the purchases via short-term loans.
The initial balance sheet showed about two-fifths of Hoare’s assets still were in
the goldsmith business when this first surviving balance sheet was drawn up.21
Customers borrowing for plate held 30 per cent of all Hoare’s assets. Holdings of
silver, gold, diamonds and pearls accounted for an additional 8 per cent of assets.
These assets quickly declined as a share of Hoare’s total; the bank terminated almost
all of its goldsmithing activities such as producing silverware, mending plate and
crafting jewellery and redirected its activities towards banking. Assets used for
goldsmithing initially were replaced by loans without interest, which may be seen as
holdovers from the goldsmithing business. They show Hoare’s Bank providing
liquidity to some of its customers and operating in the fashion of a pawnshop.
The largest individual category of assets throughout the early eighteenth century
was loans against interest (as well as money lent for securities purchases), fluctuating
around half of the balance sheet. Loans bearing no interest (but not for plate)
declined relatively quickly. The firm extended 62 loans without interest in 1704; by
1721, there were only 13 transactions in this category. Richard Hoare appears to
have taken longer to reduce the volume of loans without interest than he took
with loans against plate, but he clearly was reducing both in the first decades of the
eighteenth century. As he learned banking and conceptualised himself as a banker,
he moved out of these other activities.
The years before and during the South Sea Bubble showed a rise in the share of
cash holdings. As the London financial market entered a period of great turbulence,
Figure 2. The composition of Hoare’s assets
21 Child’s recorded a similar proportion. Quinn (private communication).159 banking as an emerging technology
Hoare’s Bank reverted to some of its older practices to weather the financial storms.
There were £28,189 of diamonds, pearls, gold and silver on the balance sheet in
1718, equivalent to one-fifth of its total value. These assets from Hoare’s previous
profession decreased in importance during the 1720s, but they were not totally
abandoned a decade after the bubble. Offsetting this conservative stance, Hoare’s
also invested in the riskiest of financial instruments: South Sea stock. The 1720
accounts were drawn up on 24 June, and the bank had 14 per cent of its assets
invested in South Sea stock.22 The bank continued to trade (and hold positions) in
South Sea stock after the bubble deflated, even though these transactions were
not captured by successive balance sheets (usually drawn up in September). Some
dealing in South Sea stock was recorded as late as 1731.23
Hoare’s bought and sold bonds and shares on behalf of its customers and for its
own account, just as other goldsmith-bankers did.24 It held government bonds and
Bank of England stock at various points in time, and became a substantial investor in
the South Sea Company. Richard Hoare was a Tory, while the government was
dominated by Whigs. The Bank of England was their creature, and Hoare’s Bank,
while opposing the formation and recharter of the Bank of England, owned some of
its shares. Child’s was a Whig bank and had far more government business.25
Cash balances rose sharply as a percentage of all assets after the end of the South
Sea Bubble – where the bank had made do with one-fifth cash before the crisis, it
now kept one-third of its assets in liquid funds.26 If withdrawals had followed a
normal distribution, the pre-bubble bank would have faced a 3 per cent chance of
running out of cash and consequently facing a crisis every 30 years. After the bubble,
as a result of becoming very cautious, the bank reduced the risk to once every 1,500
years.27 This is a highly conservative stance, but may have been warranted in a world
without a lender of last resort and where all the Hoare’s partners were subject to
unlimited liability.
We tested the hypothesis that asset allocations changed significantly after 1720, as
summarised in Table 1. The share of loans against interest did not change much after
1720. The share of cash increased enormously and significantly, from 20 per cent to
22 The bank put the value of shares (approximately) at their historical cost – 250 per share. The market
price on the day before had been 765.
23 Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth, ‘Riding the South Sea Bubble’, American Economic Review,
95.4 (2004).
24 Carlos, Key and Dupree, ‘Learning and the creation of stock-market institutions’.
25 Henry Peregrine Hoare, Hoare’s Bank. A Record 1673–1932 (London, 1932), p. 18; Quinn, ‘The
Glorious Revolution’s effect on English private finance’.
26 See Table 1.
27 We calculated the average cash balance and the standard deviations, and derived the probability of
the reserve ratio falling below zero. There is good reason to think that deposit withdrawals follow
a lognormal distribution, which would mean that the bank’s risk of running out of reserves was
markedly higher before and after 1720 – and that the relative difference is probably somewhat
smaller. Cf. Roger Chen and Dale Osborne, ‘Random deposits, liquidation discount and deposit
insurance pricing’, University of Texas Working Paper (2002).160 peter temin and hans-joachim voth
34 per cent of assets. Hoare’s must have been scared enough by the turmoil of the
bubble years to want a more secure cushion against a recurrence of financial turbu-
lence. The rise in cash was accomplished by an almost equally large fall in the share
of non-interest-bearing loans after 1720, and Hoare’s did not lose much revenue
when it increased its cash reserves. This finding documents our assertion that
Hoare’s was learning how to operate a bank. It increasingly charged interest for its
loans, as bankers do, and it kept ample cash reserves to preserve its liquidity. These
are the second and third of our indexes of learning, and the gradual process, acceler-
ating after 1720, confirms our view that the learning period for this new activity was
a long one.28 Given the novelty of deposit-based lending, there was no general
agreement on the required size of the cash ratio, and Hoare’s appears to have stayed
well inside the risk frontier.29
To see how Hoare’s Bank completed the transition to the banking business by the
early eighteenth century, we need to examine its liabilities as well as its assets. Their
liabilities were recorded as deposits by individuals of cash, money owed for plate and
jewels, debts to goldsmiths and jewellers (as well as employees, in some years),
the capital of the partner(s), plus profits for the past year.30 In 1702, for example,
Richard Hoare held £31,788 of the bank’s capital.31 The bank also owed £113,997
to depositors, as well as £537 for plate and £42 to ‘several plate workers and other
workmen’. From 1703 onwards, Henry Hoare was in partnership with his father,
Richard Hoare, and profits were divided according to a two-thirds/one-third
Table 1. Asset shares at Hoare’s – before and after the South Sea Bubble
pre-1720 1720–42 difference t-statistic+
interest-bearing loans 51.8 52.8 1 0.22
Cash 19.6 33.8 14.2 4.13*
non-interest bearing loans 19.8 9.9 −9.9 3.2*
loans for plate purchases 3.5 0.24 −3.26 2.2*
Plate 4.7 1.9 −2.8 0.74
Note: * indicates significance at the 1% level
+ assuming equal variances
28 We experimented with our sample selection, excluding the somewhat unusual year of 1718 – the
results were almost identical. They are available from the authors upon request.
29 J. K. Horsefield, ‘The cash ratio in English banks before 1800’, Journal of Political Economy, 57
(February 1949), pp. 70–74.
30 This practice changed in later years, when the partners’ capital is subsumed under the category of
amounts due to others.
31 Note that, with unlimited liability partnerships, this concept of equity in the family firm is
somewhat artificial. Yet Hoare’s used this as a distinct category of liability, and it is not identical
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allocation formula. Both Hoares appear to have kept substantial fractions of their
fortune invested in the bank. By 1706, for example, we see them dividing profits of
£1,839. Henry Hoare also received £241 for interest on the £4,029 he had invested
in the firm by then (for an interest rate of exactly 6 per cent). In the same year, his
father’s investment stood at £52,934. Interestingly, while notionally liable for their
businesses’ debts to the full value of their personal assets, the partners designated
some of their personal wealth as bank capital, on which interest was paid at the
maximum allowable rate.
Equity in the firm fluctuated considerably from year to year, as the Hoares
invested in the bank in some years and took money out in others. By 1710, Richard
and Henry Hoare together had investments worth £74,939 in the bank, equivalent
to 44 per cent of all liabilities. In 1720, Henry Hoare was in business with Benjamin
Hoare, his younger brother, yet their combined equity in the bank only amounted
to £39,608, approximately half the partner’s capital in 1710. Family events such as
the death of an individual partner were important determinants of the amount of
business the firm could undertake, and of its financing structure. The Hoare family
did not attain the favourable upward trend of joint equity until after the initial
learning period. They clearly were invested (financially and materially) in the bank
for the long term, although Richard Hoare did not live to see his sons create a
steadily growing business.
The partners at Hoare’s leveraged their own investment in the bank via the
money kept in the cash accounts of their clients. Since their move to Fleet Street,
the bank as a general rule no longer paid interest on the deposits of its clients.32
Figure 3. Hoare’s return on assets and equity, leverage ratio
32 Richard Hoare to Madam Jane Hursey, dated 9 Oct. 1703, cited in Hoare, Hoare’s Bank, p. 16.162 peter temin and hans-joachim voth
Before the South Sea Bubble, the size of the balance sheets tended to be between
two and six times larger than the equity of the Hoare family. This meant that the
family had a large personal stake in the bank, the fourth index of its learning process.
Only after Richard and Henry Hoare understood the new business could they
expand their banking business beyond the scope of their family assets. The Hoare
family became more aggressive after the South Sea Bubble, with a leverage ratio that
rose rapidly to 12 by 1725. At its most extreme, Hoare’s had approximately £11 in
assets for every pound of partners’ equity. This is a remarkably high figure for a bank
that ultimately survived for centuries – the Basle I accords required modern banks to
maintain a similar equity ratio to fulfill capital adequacy requirements, despite access
to a lender of last resort.33 Unsurprisingly, the year of peak profitability before 1710
also coincided with a relatively high leverage ratio.
Some accounts are missing for the crucial years around 1710, and we cannot say
with certainty how difficult the position of the bank became. It is clear that the
initially high rates of profitability proved unsustainable. The return on equity
declined alongside the leverage ratio. Richard and Henry Hoare may well have
tided over the bank with their personal assets in the hard years after 1710. They
certainly derived little or no income from the bank in those years over and above the
6 per cent that they paid themselves as interest. When the bank began to grow
after 1720, it made many fewer loans without interest and increased the partners’
leverage.
These signs of successful learning should have increased the bank’s profits, but
only limited information on profits has survived. The bank calculated ‘excess
profits’, after paying interest on partners’ capital. We calculate the overall return,
including interest payments. The average return on assets fluctuated between 2 and
4 per cent. But while Hoare’s bank showed a gain of 2.7 per cent on assets in 1703,
this translated into a return on equity of 15.8 per cent. By 1710, gearing had declined
to 1:2.2, and the existing assets generated a low return of only 2.5 per cent. This
translated into a return on equity of 5.5 per cent for this year. While ‘excess’ profits
had averaged £2,775 in prior years, they dropped to £216, leaving Henry Hoare, as
the junior partner, with £72 for his efforts in 1710. Between 1702 and 1715, the
partners earned 10 per cent on average, and probably less. The Hoares received a
return over and above the interest that they could have earned if they had put their
money into (relatively safe) government bonds, but the margin was at times very
small. In the second decade of the eighteenth century, profits were even lower and
sometimes negative. In 1710 and thereafter, the partners might have been close to
abandoning the business, but Hoare’s Bank did not close its doors.
Information on actual profits is very rare for the years after 1720. When we find
it recorded, however, profitability appears to have been high – ‘excess’ profits
averaged £9,492 after 1726, or nearly twice as much as for the years 1703–15. At its
33 Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole, The Prudential Regulation of Banks, translation, Walras-Pareto
Lectures, vol. 1 (Cambridge and London, 1994).163 banking as an emerging technology
high point in 1730, the bank managed a return of 6.2 per cent on assets, which
implies that the return on equity must have easily been in the double digits, and
possibly higher than 20 per cent. For the years 1702–12, when we have information
on both total lending against interest and on profits for the partners, interest income
constituted 84 per cent of overall earnings.34 This index of learning shows how
Richard and Henry Hoare learned to extract a steady stream of profit from lending
at interest.
An additional source of profitability for Hoare’s was proprietary trading. In the
run-up to the South Sea Bubble, the partners earned ample profits. They also were
wise enough to sell while prices were still high. After the bubble burst, in November
1721, they took some of their trading profits out of the bank (amounting to over
£27,000). High profits were the result of high leverage and a positive rate of growth.
It is the final index that the period of learning the business had given way to a period
of sustained profitability. Henry Hoare celebrated this transition by purchasing and
building the country house Stourhead in 1720, which is now the property of the
National Trust.
Joslin argued that 1710 was a bad year for London banks in general and that many
private banks disappeared.35 Hoare’s suffered, but Richard Hoare stuck it out. The
tumultuous years of the South Sea Bubble also witnessed high bank mortality.
Hoare’s was involved in the asset inflation and profited from it, but emerged intact
from this crisis as well. Even though the rate of return earned by the Hoare’s does
not look impressive in many of the bank’s early years, their continuation in business
while others were exiting shows great determination and considerable skill. While
recording a good return on capital in some years, the partners were also making an
investment in the intellectual capital needed to operate in this new business.
III
The evolution of Hoare’s banking activities shows a particular form of learning-by-
doing. To be sure, we need to verify that these changes were not due to other forces.
The annual balance sheets reflected the influence of three factors – the demand for
banking services, the supply of capital and deposits, and the managerial decisions by
the partners at Hoare’s on how to run their business. Having decided to exit the
goldsmith’s business around 1700, the scale and scope of Hoare’s banking activities
evolved rapidly over time, only to shift in a very significant fashion after the South
Sea Bubble. If our interpretation emphasising learning is correct, we should be able
to show that the bank’s changing fortunes were not driven by differences in the
external environment.
34 We assume that Hoare’s earned 5 per cent on the amount labelled ‘as lent with interest’ in the
balance sheet.
35 Joslin, ‘London private bankers, 1720–85’.164 peter temin and hans-joachim voth
The bank’s difficult years before 1720, for example, could have been the result of
a more uncertain or depressed business environment. Aggregate evidence on
business conditions before 1750 is not abundant, but there is little evidence that
business conditions improved after 1720. True, 1710 appears to have been a year
with a severe financial panic, but the bank’s fortunes had been declining before this
date, and the crisis of 1720 brought no similar drop in profitability. Ashton classified
eight years as periods of depression in the two decades before 1720 – exactly the
same number as during the period 1720–42.36 The number of bankruptcies also does
not suggest that low and highly variable returns were the result of an unusually
unstable macroeconomic environment. Hoppit’s time series shows that the average
number of individuals going bankrupt was higher before 1720 than thereafter. The
year-to-year variability was lower after the South Sea Bubble, but the difference is
not large.37 Since defaults were never key to Hoare’s profitability, any link to
Hoare’s would have to be very indirect.
Political events also cannot provide a ready explanation for the swings in Hoare’s
fortunes. The War of the Spanish Succession raged for most of the initial period that
we describe as a period of learning. According to the calculations by Yafeh and
Sussman, the government faced particularly high borrowing rates in 1702/3 and
1710. Strong competition from the government for deposits could be the kind of
shock that may have undermined bank profitability, but it should have had similar
effects in 1702/3 as it did in 1710. Yet profits were relatively good at the beginning
of the period, and much lower in the years before and including 1710. The decline
in deposits in 1710 was small – a mere 4.7 per cent. We therefore conclude that
exogenous shocks cannot account for the evolution of lending behaviour and profits
over time, and that changes in business practice reflect deliberate decisions made by
the staff at Hoare’s.
The bank reduced loans without interest, and increased cash reserves instead. This
added flexibility and safety, which eventually proved useful; the growth of profits
from 1702 to 1742 reflected this change. Providing liquidity short-term to current or
prospective customers clearly made sense to the partners at the start of the century,
given business practices at the time. Nonetheless, they apparently were aware of the
negative impact that this particular activity had on their bottom line and strove to
reduce it over the medium term. The partners experimented with the degree to
which they needed to offer interest-free loans, the type of collateral required for
each group of customers, and the appropriate terms for loans. How do we know that
the changes in the allocation of assets were not simply random, or the result of
market forces pointing in one direction? We have already demonstrated that the
differences in balance-sheet composition are statistically significant. The crucial shift
36 T. S. Ashton, Economic Fluctuations in England, 1700–1800 (Oxford, 1959), pp. 116–21, 172–3.
37 The t-test shows a significant increase from an average of 227 in 1704–19 compared to 289
bankruptcies in 1720–43. Based on Julian Hoppit, Risk and Failure in English Business, 1700–1800
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out of non-interest-bearing loans into those against interest and cash was a gradual
process, but it was accelerated by the events of 1720. Learning appears a valid inter-
pretation because any given reduction in lending without interest in 1705 would
have been as useful, ceteris paribus, as a reduction in 1725. Yet, earlier, Hoare’s had
probably not developed a good sense of which kind of customers merited this kind
of service, either in terms of probability to repay or in terms of possible future
business.
A key event in the evolution of banking practices at Hoare’s was the South Sea
Bubble of 1720. The main impact of the South Sea Bubble on the financial sector
had been in the form of a scramble for liquidity.38 Neal argues that the third
subscription of stock led to a general tightness in the money market, with lenders
calling in loans in many cases. We do not know exactly how many early banks went
out of business in 1720 and 1721. The total number of bankruptcies in all sectors of
the economy did not reach particularly high levels in these years.39 At the same time,
there is some evidence to suggest that partnerships engaged in banking were dis-
solved or went bankrupt at an unusually high rate in 1720/1, as a result of problems
remaining liquid. At least five distinguished houses stopped payment in October
alone.40
After 1720, Hoare’s partners apparently decided that illiquidity – not insolvency –
was the greatest risk they faced. We do not know if the bank itself had come close to
running out of cash in September 1720. Yet as goldsmiths they had not been subject
to the same risks as bankers, and may have needed the spur of crisis to embrace safer
practices. Anderson, writing two generations after the bubble burst, described the
situation as follows:
The stock ... had fallen to one hundred and seventy-five per cent... whereupon there
appeared great uneasiness and clamour amongst the monied men, which produced a great
run or demand for cash at the Bank, and a greater one on the private bankers who had
generally lent out much of their cash on South Sea stock and subscriptions, in consequence
of which several very substantial ones were obliged to stop payment for some time.41
Since only a small part of Hoare’s balance sheet was actually exposed to adverse
price movements when the bubble burst (the bank had sold most of its substantial
holdings in time), the partners probably felt that more equity – ready to absorb losses
arising from defaults and losses on investments – was not crucial.42 This apparently
38 Neal, The Rise of Financial Capitalism.
39 Hoppit, Risk and Failure in English Business, 1700–1800, p. 132.
40 Joslin, ‘London private bankers, 1720–85’, p. 174; John Carswell, The South Sea Bubble (London,
1960), p. 163. Others experienced great difficulty in meeting their obligations.
41 Adam Anderson, An Historical and Chronological Deduction of the Origin of Commerce, vol. 3 (London,
1801), p. 114.
42 It may also be that their growing overall wealth allowed them to devote less capital to the banking
business, since the distinction between total net private wealth and partners’ equity is more of a
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led to a key change in the bank’s way of managing risks. While the early years
showed a combination of low cash reserves and relatively healthy equity cushions,
the partners reversed this policy after 1720, holding enough cash to satisfy deposi-
tors’ demands even in extreme circumstances. Before 1720, the bank had on average
kept one pound sterling in cash for every £3.3 in deposits; after the bubble, it
increased this to one pound for every £2.5 in deposits. This implies that, after
approximately two decades of experience, they realised that defaults were not a
major concern, at least for the kind of clientele they were serving. Bank runs and
other forms of liquidity crunches, however, were a distinct possibility. The bank’s
highly conservative stance here may actually help us to identify one factor that
contributed to its longevity.
We should note that Hoare’s earlier practice easily qualified as relatively prudent
already, at least by the standards of eighteenth-century manuals on banking and
commerce. Richard Cantillon, who knew the partners at Hoare’s bank, advised in
his Essai sur la nature du commerce en général:
It is easy to understand ... that the sums of money which a Goldsmith or a Banker can lend
at interest or divert from his cash are naturally proportionable [sic] to the practice and
conduct of his clients; that while we have seen Bankers who were safe with a cash-reserve of
one-tenth, others can hardly keep less than one half or two-thirds, though their credit be as
high as that of the first... The most fortunate is the Banker who has for clients rich gentle-
men who are always looking for safe employment for their money without wishing to invest
it at interest while they wait.43
Cantillon argued that 10 per cent was an adequate cash ratio for this group, while
wealthy individuals, such as landowners, who deposited working capital with a
bank, normally required a cash ratio of up to 50 per cent. In the case of merchants
and traders, 66 per cent would have been necessary, as withdrawals could be highly
irregular and rapid. Given Hoare’s client base, it must have resembled the ideal-type
of the ‘most fortunate banker’ relatively closely. Relative to the standard of 10 per
cent described by Cantillon as normal for a bank in this group, Hoare’s pre-bubble
lending already looked highly cautious, and its cash ratios afterwards were very
conservative. By shortening the average maturity of its loans, as we document
below, the bank also was increasing the extent to which it could rely on repayments
of loans to add to its cash reserves at any point in time.44
The opportunity costs were substantial. In 1724, the balance sheet recorded
£70,286 in cash. At an average effective rate of interest of 4 per cent, this would
have been tantamount to £2,811 in potential revenue lost. Had the bank maintained
the cash-liability ratio of the pre-1720 period, it could have earned some additional
43 Richard Cantillon, Essai sur la nature du commerce en général (New York, 1755 [1964]), pp. 299–303
[spelling and capitalisation as per the original]. See J. K. Horsefield, ‘The cash ratio in English banks
before 1899’, Journal of Political Economy, 57 (February 1949), pp. 70–4, for more debate.
44 For the shorter duration of loans to help in explaining the change in cash holdings, some repayments
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£1,022.45 Whether from direct difficulty or through observing the general distress,
Hoare’s had learned during the turbulent years 1710–20 that banking requires ample
liquidity. After the bubble, the bank decided to accept lower earnings by keeping
more reserves so as to deal with fluctuations in demand.
The change in behaviour documented in the cash registers of Hoare’s is certainly
compatible with the realisation that a sudden liquidity crunch was a much more
likely event than defaults on loans. The rise in cash reserves is probably best inter-
preted in the context of the simultaneous decline in partners’ equity in the firm. The
latter was not the result of capital losses during the South Sea Bubble, for the bank’s
dealings during the bubble period were highly profitable.46 Richard Hoare died in
1718, and only part of his capital remained in the bank. Yet the bank decided not to
reduce the size of its assets to the same extent as the death of Richard Hoare had
reduced its equity. In only one year did the leverage ratio drop below its pre-bubble
average. Another way of describing the change post-1720 is to argue that while
individual bankers such as the founder, Richard Hoare, did not change their
business practices markedly, the bank itself ‘learned’ in the form of new partners
changing key variables such as the cash/deposit ratio and the leverage ratio –
compatible with Thomas Kuhn’s view of how paradigm shifts occur in the sciences.
An early eighteenth-century banker had to manage a number of risks, most of
them familiar to bank managers today. Default of loan customers was a constant
threat, albeit small in the case of Hoare’s, and sudden withdrawals of cash deposits
could raise the spectre of illiquidity. Investment securities could sharply decline in
value, and counterparties might not live up to their obligations – especially in bill
and stock exchange transactions. Economists normally conceive of these risks as the
spread of a distribution around an expected mean. In a classic book, Frank Knight
proposed a distinction between ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’.47 In the case of risk, a
probability distribution can be calculated. Uncertainty, however, refers to a situ-
ation when information is insufficient even to calculate probabilities.48 Eventually,
as certain types of business become more common, uncertainty is reduced to mere
risk. Yet banks at the time of Richard and Henry Hoare faced substantial ‘Knightian
uncertainty’. They could not know much about their customers’ expectations, and
the extent to which customers were likely to switch accounts if some services such as
occasional interest-free loans were not forthcoming. While individuals can always
act ‘as if’ they could assign probabilities, their freedom for experimentation is
severely constrained. Only when faced with a severe crisis of profitability did the
firm take drastic steps to curtail interest-free lending.
45 Hoare’s had a cash-liability ratio of 30.8% in 1724, similar to the post-bubble sample average. The
pre-crash average was 19.6%. 2,811*((30.8−19.6) = 1,022. This would have been equivalent to
more than one-third of the average annual pre-bubble profit.
46 Temin and Voth, ‘Riding the South Sea Bubble’.
47 Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Boston, 1921).
48 Larry Epstein and Tan Wang, ‘Intertemporal asset pricing under Knightian uncertainty’,
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In addition, the evolving financial system of eighteenth-century Britain was
subject to infrequent but very considerable shocks brought on by financial crises,
wars and individual bankruptcies.49 For bankers who had only been taking deposits
for a few years (or decades at most), the crises of 1710 and 1720 must have appeared
like the ‘perfect storm’ that sank the hedge fund LTCM in 1998.50 This implies that,
ex ante, finding the right responses to the dangers of illiquidity and insolvency arising
from sharp asset price changes and a general scramble for liquidity was next to
impossible. The survival of individual firms would then be the result of idiosyncratic
factors that, ex post, turned out to have provided a sufficient safety margin. Indeed,
generalised Knightian uncertainty – amongst investors, depositors and bankers – at a
time when traded joint stock companies and deposit banking were new and as yet
untested in their effects, may well have contributed to the very wide swings in asset
prices and in the demand for cash themselves.51 It also is likely to have kept the
number of entrants in the new business of deposit banking lower than it otherwise
would have been – most individuals have a strong preference to avoid Knightian
uncertainty, a regularity known as the ‘Ellsberg paradox’.52
IV
Having documented that the bank finally began to grow in a relatively steady fashion
after 1720, we need to understand how this happened. The partners made loans as
banks do, but in a particular eighteenth-century way. They kept cash reserves to
preserve liquidity, and they had to extend loans in a way that preserved their
solvency. The years between the Glorious Revolution and the South Sea Bubble
contain enough loans to detail Hoare’s learning process. Since Hoare’s Bank moved
to Fleet Street in 1690 and the surviving loan records start later in that decade, we
have slightly more than two decades of banking activities. As we count them,
Hoare’s Bank made about 800 loans in this time.
The bank reported loans in its register using two pages at a time. Credits were
listed on the left-hand page and debits on the right-hand page. Each page was ruled
in advance into several sections, where a customer’s transactions were recorded.
Only the simplest transactions, however, consisted of a single loan and repayment.
The fixed space often contains records of multiple payments and receipts that were
organised by the bank as part of a single transaction. The modern experience where
49 Julian Hoppit, ‘Financial crises in eighteenth-century England’, Economic History Review, 39 (1986);
Hoppit, Risk and Failure in English Business, 1700–1800; Isabel Schnabel and Hyun Song Shin,
‘Liquidity and contagion – the crisis of 1763’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 6.2 (2004).
50 Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed (London, 2001).
51 Epstein and Wang show that Knightian uncertainty can lead to multiple equilibria in asset prices,
opening up the possibility of substantial volatility as a result of ‘animal spirits’ (Epstein and Wang,
‘Intertemporal asset pricing under Knightian uncertainty’).
52 Daniel Ellsberg, ‘Risk, ambiguity, and the savage axioms’, in The Economics of Uncertainty, vol. 2:
Uncertainty and Dynamics, ed. John D. Hey (1997).169 banking as an emerging technology
interest is paid either regularly or at the end of a loan, signified by a single repayment
of principal, describes some, but by no means all, of the bank’s loan activities.
The clerks at Hoare’s were meticulous in recording the titles and positions of
their clients, although all classes were entered sequentially in the same register.
Whether in the case of Lady Charlotte de Roye (borrowing £50 on a ‘yellow
brilliant diamond ring’) or the Hon. Brigadier Hastings, the exact position was
recorded. In the years before the South Sea Bubble, clients included inter alia Sir
Samuel Barnadiston, governor of the East India Company, John Beaumont, geolo-
gist and Fellow of the Royal Society, Brooke Bridges, chancellor of the exchequer,
Sir William Booth, commissioner of the navy, a bishop of Chichester, a director of
the Bank of England, Sir Thomas Davies, Lord Mayor of London, the Countess of
Dorchester and Edmund Dunch, the master of the royal household.
Bank clerks appear to have recorded loans in the following order. First, the loan
itself as a credit, then repayments as debits. Finally, there is sometimes an entry on
the credit side for the interest, seen as a claim by the bank on the borrower, which
enabled the debits and credits to agree. The rate of interest was almost never
recorded, nor was the term of the loan. Occasionally, the clerk would enter the
agreed interest rate along with interest payments. In most cases, we can only infer
the ex post rate of interest based on the payments recorded. This mode of record
keeping makes it hard for the twenty-first-century economic historian to recover
the interest rate being charged. It is an open question whether it made it hard for the
early seventeenth-century banker to know what he was charging. One possible
reason for this mode of record keeping may have been to avoid prosecution under
the usury law that restricted interest to 6 per cent before 1714 and 5 per cent there-
after. We will see later, however, that Hoare’s Bank generally was in compliance
with the usury laws. This mode of record keeping instead may have been a holdover
from Hoare’s days as a goldsmith where making, pawning and selling jewellery were
all part of a day’s work. In that business, the interest received was of secondary
importance and not recorded or often even charged.
The bank made a distinction between loans at interest and loans without interest
in its balance sheets, but they were all entered sequentially in the loan register. We
do not know with certainty if the bank decided that the interest rate would be zero
at the time that the loan was made. It does, however, appear that the bank provided
financing as part of its goldsmithing business, and that the granting of small, interest-
free loans was an echo of this earlier practice. Other loans at zero (or negligible)
interest are what we would call defaults, that is, loans of long duration which were
paid finally by selling the collateral (typically jewellery) or by transferring the loan to
a partner.
Many, but by no means all, loans were made against collateral assets. The collat-
eral typically was jewellery at the start of the century, but increasingly it was stocks
or bonds in the 1710s. Aristocratic borrowers were identified as such in the loan
register, but they were recorded sequentially with other loans. Aristocrats may
possibly have had easier access to credit in general, but they did not get segregated170 peter temin and hans-joachim voth
into a separate account. London had become sufficiently egalitarian by 1700 for
aristocrat and commoner to use the same bank in the same way.
The bank loaned against a wide range of collateral, ranging from a sword hilt to
diamonds and plate, from mortgages to bonds, and from Westphalian ham to Tuscan
wine. Depending on its assessment of a client’s trustworthiness, it pressed for
assets to back up the loan. Thus Richard Hoare wrote to Thomas Povey, Esq., who
had asked for a loan:
The respect I always had for you makes me willing to comply with what you desire in your
letter, but I hope that in my Patience & Civilitie will not doe me prejudice that if it shall
please God to take you to himself ..., you will now give me the satisfaction of one line to
lett me know how I shall be paid.53
If a client defaulted, the security deposited in exchange for the loan was often sold.
Overall, the vast majority of clearly identifiable defaults in our dataset (12 out of 15)
involved lending against jewellery, gold, silver or plate. This underlines the
declining role of pawns in the activities of Hoare’s Bank.54
Collateralised lending constituted approximately half of total lending against
interest for the firm. Table 2 shows the number of loans and their value, by type
of security offered. The size and duration of most loans is similar to those at
Child’s, although the Whig Child loaned to the government far more than the Tory
Hoare.55 Transactions without collateral typically were relatively small, with an
average value of £676. Secured loans were almost twice as large: £1,147. Loans
without collateral also were relatively short; they were repaid after an average of
461 days, whereas some kinds of secured loans had substantially longer duration.
Table 2. Loan values by type of collateral, 1692–1724
Collateral Median Mean duration
offered value value N % of total Value % of total (days)
securities 1,000 2,214 53 8 117,342 20 497
mortgage 1,279 2,432 31 5 75,392 13 2013
plate 200 454 52 8 23,608 4 1411
bond 300 727 73 11 53,071 9 1121
note 100 610 26 4 15,860 3 594
penal bill 65 478 10 2 4,780 1 1667
other 170 883 34 5 30,022 5 444
none 200 676 378 58 255,528 44 461
total 657 575,603
53 Hoare, Hoare’s Bank, p. 16.
54 Since the collateral could be readily sold, it was also easier to identify the defaults.
55 Quinn, ‘The Glorious Revolution’s effect on English private finance’, table 4, p. 608.171 banking as an emerging technology
Mortgages recorded an average duration of 2,013 days, comparable to some modern
mortgages. The Marquis of Winchester, for example, borrowed £3,000, and only
repaid after some 14 years. Legally speaking, however, mortgages had a six-month
term, and could be recalled by the lender after that.56
The composition of lending by security offered as summarised in Table 2 does not
reveal the striking changes that occurred in the first decades of the eighteenth cen-
tury. Loans against plate declined from 14 per cent of the total before 1700 to 3 per
cent in the first decade of the new century to 1 per cent thereafter as Hoare’s Bank
became ever more distinct from Richard Hoare’s previous enterprise. Mortgages
were the single most important security offered in the years before 1710, accounting
for approximately one-third of collateralised lending. Securities were also popular,
and their importance grew significantly after 1710. Over half of all lending secured
through assets held by the bank was in the form of securities in the years 1710–21, a
period which contains the South Sea Bubble.
Loans without interest appeared alongside all other transactions, as part of the
continuous records of transactions with all customers. In some cases, these loans
were clearly designed to help overcome a temporary cash shortage. While the mean
duration of 502 days suggests long-term lending, it is heavily influenced by a few
outliers. The maximum length recorded was in the case of William Dobbs, who
borrowed £40 in 1707 and only repaid in 1715. In a more typical case, on 14 April
1699, Madam Elizabeth Gough received £10, leaving candlesticks as collateral.
According to the loan ledger, she returned the next day to repay the loan. The
median duration of an interest-free loan was 84 days (versus 334 days for non-zero
loans). The typical zero-interest loan lasted less than three months, while the median
interest-bearing loan lasted almost a year.
Some transactions seem puzzling to the modern historian’s eye. Ann and
Catherine Goare borrowed £20 in August 1698, and repaid £20 8s in December
(equivalent to an APR of 6.3 per cent – Hoare’s evidently aimed to charge them 6
per cent interest). In February of the next year, the two Goares borrowed again, for
the same amount, leaving the same type of collateral – a bond – and repaid some
nine months later. This time, however, there was no charge for interest. The evolu-
tion and the payment details of non-interest-bearing loans at Hoare’s casts doubt on
Quinn’s interpretation of them at Child’s, a rival London bank.57 He argued that
these loans contained hidden interest charges, in an effort to circumvent the usury
laws that limited the maximum interest rates that could be paid. In effect, according
to this interpretation, the Goares would have actually only received a fraction of the
£20, and then had to repay in full. We find no evidence to support this hypothesis
in the case of Hoare’s. Given that the bank had just completed a successful transac-
tion with the Goares, receiving its money back on time and with interest, what
56 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783, 1st US edn (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989).
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possible reason could there have been to charge a higher interest rate? Also, the bank
recorded loans with interest separately from other loans on its annual balance sheet,
again suggesting that the other loans were not interest-bearing. Average yields of
4–5 per cent on this portion of the balance sheet can account for almost all of the
recorded profits.58 Finally, in those years when the annual balance sheets recorded
interest received separately, these must refer to ‘loans against interest’ – otherwise,
the ratio of interest received to loans outstanding suggests that loans were charged
interest below the usury rate.
The bank faced almost no problem with defaults. This was not the result of
a diversified loan portfolio. Instead, low default rates were key. Over the period
1692–1724, there are only 15 cases that were clear defaults. The average value of
these defaulted loans was £387, for a total loss of £5,817. There may have been
other non-performing loans, not marked clearly as such in the loan ledger and so
identified by us only as interest-free loans. We should note that our method of
constructing a database of loan transactions may lead us to lose some cases. When-
ever we could not match loans and repayments, we marked the loan transaction as
incomplete. Cases in this category may contain some defaults. In general, however,
we have clear indication whether a loan was in default or not – clerks would clearly
mark the state of the loan if it was transferred to one of the partners, or if collateral
was sold. Also, it may be the case that a few of the zero-interest rate loans of long
duration were in partial default. Most long-term zero loans terminated with a clerk’s
entry of ‘paid in full as lent’ or were followed by another loan, which rules out
default. We obviously cannot know how many bad loans we missed, but we suspect
the number is not large. Most interest-free loans were short, as we have noted, and
there were only a few longer loans that may have been long by virtue of not being
repaid as anticipated. Counting the length distribution of interest-free loans as
defaults changes only the details of our conclusions. The bank’s strategy of selecting
high-net-worth customers of impeccable social standing, instead of spreading its
credit risk over a larger number of borrowers, apparently made good business sense.
We do not know with certainty if bank failures were often caused by competitors
having greater difficulty in identifying the right kind of customers, but Hoare’s did
not appear to face this problem to any significant extent.
Lists of customers compiled at Hoare’s do not differentiate between those from
the goldsmith’s business and those from the lending side. Overall, the acquisition of
new clients seems to have been relatively rapid in the early eighteenth century. In
the first decade, the bank was adding close to 100 customers per year. It slowed
down markedly in the following decades, dropping to less than half the earlier rate.
In addition to aristocrats, the bank also had extensive business with minor noble-
men. In contrast to commoners, the number of new clients from the aristocracy, as
58 This does not rule out that the bank could have made additional profits, and hidden them in annual
balance sheets, too. Yet this would have been a highly complicated undertaking at a time when
balance sheets were not published or audited and there were no taxes on profits.173 banking as an emerging technology
well as minor noblemen, grew at a broadly steady rate. While the annual growth in
the bank’s client base slowed down, it also became increasingly blue-blooded.
V
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where dj = the jth, or last, payment date, d0 is the first payment date, Pj is the jth, or
last, payment, and r is the rate of return in question. This provides a good measure of
a loan’s profitability for the bank, and has been used by earlier authors.59 However,
we found that this method yielded many fractional interest rates that were hard to
understand. Deviations in payment dates due to holidays, calculation errors, round-
ing of payments or time periods, as well as defaults, affected the calculated rate of
return. But the calculated rates still did not fall into a pattern that would explain its
complexity.
For a subset of loans, we know the intended interest rate from entries in the
ledger. For example, Mrs Mary Kerwood took out a loan of £60 on 24 June 1692.
On 16 January 1697, the clerk received a payment of £16.2, and entered ‘4.5 years
interest on £60 to 24 Dec. last.’ This suggests that the intended interest rate was
exactly 6 per cent. The cash-flow method, however, implies that when Mary
Kerwood repaid £61.3 of principal and additional interest on 4 May 1697, the
internal rate of return (calculated by solving equation 1) for the bank was merely 5.5
per cent. The bank did not charge more, even though the borrower made the first
interest payment after 4.5 years, instead of annually. Hoare’s appears to have lacked
the concept of compounding at this point in time. The bank, while learning other
lessons of banking, did not abandon its reliance on simple interest.
Cases such as Mrs Kerwood are simple – we have direct evidence on the rate of
interest. In column 1 of Table 3, we refer to cases such as this as ‘direct information’.
Table 3. Interest rates on simple loans by Hoare’s Bank
Direct information Straight interest method Cash-flow
on interest rate on simple loans method +/−0.5%
Interest rate N % N % N %
0% 28 21 163 29 197 23
5% 22 17 106 19 192 23
6% 74 56 175 31 272 32
Loans at 0, 5, and 6% 132 94 444 79 661 78
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Where it is missing, we use two alternative techniques. For the subset of loans with
a simple repayment (and no interim interest payments), we calculate the amount due
under the assumption that an integer interest rate had been charged. The difference
between actual and expected repayment in almost all cases is minimal; the vast
majority of cases shows lending at 5 or 6 per cent (column 2 of Table 3, ‘straight
interest method’).60 Some of the smaller deviations are easily explained: the bank
never accepted payment on Sunday, and we infer that they were not scrupulous
about the day of the week on which they were paid, or perhaps on which they
recorded a payment.
For all loans, including the more complex ones, we also report the results of
internal rate-of-return calculations using equation 1 (referred to as the ‘cash-flow
method’). Since the latter is subject to various errors, such as the erroneous assump-
tion of compounding, we give the distribution of loans within a +/−0.5 per cent
error band. The sample size differs between columns since not all methods can be
used for all loans, and the percentage of loans with missing data is far larger with the
two constructed methods than with direct information.
The vast majority of simple loans (444 out of 563 simple loans in our sample) were
made at zero, 5 or 6 per cent. The most common interest rate was 6 per cent – by all
methods. Changes over time are not recorded in Table 3, and we need to recall that
most loans without interest were made earlier in the period and anticipate that most
loans at 5 per cent were made after the reduction in the usury rate in 1714. The
results from the straight interest-rate calculations reinforce the impression from the
other two methods – loans at 6 per cent are more common than loans at 5 per cent,
and zero-interest-rate loans are an important component of simple loan transactions.
It is instructive to compare the interest rates calculated by the three methods
directly. When we have information on the ex ante interest rate recorded by the
clerks, we can also calculate the inferred rate of interest via cash flows. The mean
difference between the two is –0.16 per cent, and the median difference is precisely
zero. In addition, the ‘straight interest method’ and the directly observed interest
rate agree in every one of the ten cases where the two samples overlap. This strongly
suggests that most deviations from 5 or 6 per cent are the result of spurious influences
like clerks’ errors, lack of compounding and rounding. Initially, Hoare’s simply lent
at 6 per cent in almost all cases where interest was charged. When the usury rate was
reduced to 5 per cent in September 1714, the bank followed immediately and
entered the evidence for this in its ledger books.
The lack of compounding benefited the bank for loans of less than a year’s length,
and it cost the bank money on credit extended for a longer period. Additional
rounding errors and the like sometimes cost the bank money and sometimes
benefited it. A typical case is Simon Harcourt, borrowing £500 on 20 February
1711. He repaid £503.61 in April, 43 days later. The cash-flow method suggests that
the interest rate charged was equivalent to 6.3 per cent. Based on the legal maximum
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and with continuous compounding, the bank should have charged him £3.44 in
interest instead of £3.61. Without compounding, the correct charge would have
been £3.53. Rounding errors and the like therefore contributed nine pence to the
bank’s excess charges, and the compounding effect contributed another eight pence.
The results, aggregated for all simple loans for which we reconstructed (non-zero)
interest rates, are summarised in Table 4.
A positive value indicates that the bank should have collected a higher amount.
The table shows that the bank initially did lose money on even the most basic loans,
and did so on a non-negligible scale in its early years. For the first five-year period,
the £40.86 lost were equivalent to 8 per cent of the value of all loans. In the next
quinquennial, when our sample size is much larger, the bank lost more in absolute
terms, but the total value is equivalent to only 0.55 per cent of the sum loaned. By
the 1710s, losses were at negligible levels, and after 1715, the bank started to make
money on its ‘errors’.
The changes over time are largely the result of two factors. First, lack of com-
pounding mattered most for very long loans; as the average duration of transactions
fell, the bank lost less. Second, the bank improved its accuracy in rounding and
calculating. By the end of the period, it often managed to ‘err’ in its own favour, that
is, it would charge customers more than should have been the case had they calcu-
lated interest exactly. This change was driven by rounding in the case of relatively
short loans – when customers borrowed for less than a year, they would sometimes
pay rates that were very high. Overall, however, the peculiarities of its system never
made a large difference to the bank’s profitability. There does not seem to have been
a strong incentive for the bank to adopt compound interest.
As Table 3 shows, there were a substantial number of loans without interest.
If they are included, the average interest rate at which people received loans was
always less than 6 per cent. In fact, most of the fluctuations in the ‘average’ are a
Table 4. Accounting practices and their cost, 1690–1725
Average loss to
Hoare’s (in £)
Quin- Number Average due to lack of due to total loss in % of the
quennial of loans duration compounding other errors in £ balance sheet
1690 3 1,912.00 13.61 0.01 40.86 8.17
1695 28 891.64 1.57 0.05 45.45 0.55
1700 77 261.77 0.10 0.21 23.93 0.04
1705 68 290.47 0.05 0.11 10.88 0.05
1710 30 257.97 0.00 0.01 0.35 0.00
1715 47 199.02 −0.07 0.10 1.42 0.00
1720 25 263.64 −0.03 0.17 3.35 0.01
1725 3 219.00 −0.37 0.05 −0.96 −0.02176 peter temin and hans-joachim voth
result of changing proportions of interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing loans. If
the non-interest loans are excluded, then the meaning of an average interest rate
becomes less clear; yet we capture the ‘typical’ cost of loans against interest (to the
customers) much more adequately, showing the mode rather than the mean. We
show the median interest rate on two types of loan in Figure 4. The top line refers to
the median interest rate for all loans contracted by Hoare’s against interest; the
bottom is the average for all loans. Including the zero-interest-rate loans markedly
increases the volatility of the series. It also obscures the downward shift in interest
rates that occurred after 1714, when the legal maximum was lowered from 6 to 5 per
cent – which is clearly apparent in the first series.61 Hoare’s Bank’s increased profit-
ability after 1720 was the result of better banking practices, not a rise in the interest
rate it charged.
The frequent use of standardised interest rates also suggests that the loan market
did not balance through changes in the interest rate. Contracted rates certainly did
not adjust smoothly in response to demand and supply. Instead, times of greater or
lower loan demand must have led to a tightening or loosening of borrowing criteria.
The first kind of loans to be recalled were probably zero-interest loans. This is
similar to what has been observed in modern credit markets, where there is also
Figure 4. Two ‘average’ interest rates, Hoare’s 1702–25
61 When we estimate a median regression for the whole period, with the average interest rate on
loans against interest as the dependent variable and a dummy for the ‘new’ usury ceiling from 1714
onwards, we obtain a coefficient of −0.9, significant at the 0.1% level. This strongly suggests that the
bank followed the new legal requirements rather closely, and that lending before and after 1714 was
almost always at the legal maximum. For methodological background, cf. Roger Koenker and
Kevin F. Hallock, ‘Quantile regression’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15.4 (2001).177 banking as an emerging technology
abundant evidence of credit rationing.62 Thus, the average interest rate at any one
point in time is unlikely to be a good indicator of scarcity in the market for private
loans.
VI
We have been able to observe in detail the transformation of a goldsmith into a
banker. While others made the transition earlier, the case of Hoare’s is one of a first
wave of goldsmiths that became successful providers of intermediation services to
the public. Several aspects of this transition are important. First, it was not quick. It
took two decades for Hoare’s Bank to find a way to expand its banking business on
any kind of regular basis. Second, it was not easy. There were crises in 1710/11 and
1720 that doomed other nascent bankers, and it was only through the skill and
determination of Richard Hoare and his descendants that failure was avoided.
Third, the process was one of learning a new business. The low profits before 1720
are best seen as foregone earnings in goldsmithing, invested in the knowledge
needed to succeed in banking.
During the early eighteenth century, Hoare’s did not differentiate the interest rate
at which it was lending; it is possible that their competitors were also using standard
rates. Using modern cash-flow based methods to back out interest rates is at variance
with the simple interest calculations without compounding that we have docu-
mented for Hoare’s. It is likely therefore that the argument made that other banks
from the same period, such as Child’s Bank, differentiated their interest rates based
on the risk profile of borrowers and the duration of its loans is not accurate.63 If our
finding is correct and broadly applicable, then England in the eighteenth century –
just like France – had a ‘priceless’ market for credit; it balanced through a process of
rationing. In addition, the typical (median) private interest rate hovered around the
usury maximum. This suggests that North and Weingast may have been wrong to
use relatively small changes in the interest rate for government borrowing as an
indicator of financial ease and constitutional change. Hoffman et al. may have exag-
gerated the contrast between Paris and London, at least at the start of the eighteenth
century.64 None of the new techniques applied by Richard Hoare and his partners
and successors necessarily required any of the institutional innovations emphasised
by North and Weingast.65
Finally, the records at Hoare’s provide us with a striking image of how business
practices were adapted to use a new business model. Deposit banking is not an easy
62 Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, ‘Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information’,
American Economic Review, 71.3 (1981).
63 Quinn, ‘The Glorious Revolution’s effect on English private finance’.
64 Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Priceless Markets: The Political
Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660–1870 (Chicago, 2000); Philip T. Hoffman, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal
and Gilles Postel-Vinay, ‘Private credit markets in Paris, 1690–1840’, The Journal of Economic History,
52.2 (1992); North and Weingast, ‘Constitutions and commitment’.
65 The only possible exception is the use of government debt as collateral in loan transactions. We
thank Stephen Quinn for this observation.178 peter temin and hans-joachim voth
technique to master – profitability is often low, and risks can be high. We know that
bank mortality in the early years of England’s financial revolution was significant.
Hoare’s increased its cash reserves dramatically after 1720, suggesting that, while the
bank was probably more cautious than some of its competitors, it anticipated runs on
its deposits. Hoare’s was cautious in its choice of loans as well as in its aggregate
balance sheets. Default rates were very low – fewer than 1.4 per cent of loans were
not repaid. Hoare’s policy of knowing its (selected) customers well turned out to be
more important than the potential benefits of risk diversification through a large
portfolio of small loans.
This suggests that one key lesson learned by this nascent bank had to do with the
nature of the potential crises it was facing – thus transforming ‘Knightian uncer-
tainty’, when an activity is so new that entrants have no sense of the distribution of
possible outcomes, into (calculable) risks. Before 1720, Hoare’s wanted to protect
itself from insolvency by devoting considerable amounts of equity. After 1720, the
partners decided that their biggest risk was not insolvency – partly since they had
changed the nature of their lending operations – but rather illiquidity.66 They there-
fore reduced equity and increased cash reserves. Since loans are equal to equity plus
deposits less cash reserves, ignoring other balance-sheet items, this change decreased
the amount of loans the bank could offer for a given volume of deposits. They must
have thought this was worth the opportunity cost. To be sure, Hoare’s continued to
use simple, not compound, interest, probably did not fix the duration of loans, and
did not establish regular payment dates for its clients. As we have shown, its earnings
did not suffer greatly from these elementary deficits, partly because the bank had
changed the maturity profile of its lending. Learning and the evolution of England’s
financial system therefore operated through two channels – the successful adaptation
of techniques at the level of the individual financial institution such as Hoare’s,
possibly as a result of old-style partners dying at a convenient time, and by ‘Darwin-
ian’ learning at the aggregate level through the elimination of unsuccessful entrants.
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